Tor Project blog

New Release: Tails 7.6.1

2026-04-08T00:00:00Z

This release is an emergency release to fix important security vulnerabilities in Tor Browser.

Changes and updates

Update Tor Browser to 15.0.9, which fixes several vulnerabilities in Firefox 140.9.1.

We are not aware of these vulnerabilities being exploited in practice.

Update the Tor client to 0.4.9.6.
Update Thunderbird to 140.9.0.
Update some firmware packages. This improves support for newer hardware: graphics, Wi-Fi, and so on.

For more details, read our changelog.

Get Tails 7.6.1

To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 7.0 or later to 7.6.1.
If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an automatic upgrade, please try to do a manual upgrade.

To install Tails 7.6.1 on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of upgrading.

To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails 7.6.1 directly:

Support and feedback

For support and feedback, visit the Support section on the Tails website.

New Release: Tor Browser 15.0.9

2026-04-07T00:00:00Z

Tor Browser 15.0.9 is now available from the Tor Browser download page and also from our distribution directory.

This version includes important security updates to Firefox.

Send us your feedback

If you find a bug or have a suggestion for how we could improve this release, please let us know.

Full changelog

The full changelog since Tor Browser 15.0.8 is:

All Platforms
- Updated Tor to 0.4.9.6
- Updated NoScript to 13.6.15.1984
- Bug tor-browser#44837: Rebase Tor Browser stable onto 140.9.1esr
Windows + macOS + Linux
- Updated Firefox to 140.9.1esr
Android
- Updated GeckoView to 140.9.1esr
Build System
- All Platforms
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41758: Rename tools/signing/deploy-legacy to tools/signing/redeploy-update_responses-release
- Windows + macOS
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41741: Create a 13.5-specific update path

New Alpha Release: Tor Browser 16.0a5

2026-04-01T00:00:00Z

Tor Browser 16.0a5 is now available from the Tor Browser download page and also from our distribution directory.

This version includes important security updates to Firefox.

⚠️ Reminder: The Tor Browser Alpha release-channel is for testing only. As such, Tor Browser Alpha is not intended for general use because it is more likely to include bugs affecting usability, security, and privacy.

Moreover, Tor Browser Alphas are now based on Firefox's betas. Please read more about this important change in the Future of Tor Browser Alpha blog post.

If you are an at-risk user, require strong anonymity, or just want a reliably-working browser, please stick with the stable release channel.

Send us your feedback

If you find a bug or have a suggestion for how we could improve this release, please let us know.

Full changelog

The full changelog since Tor Browser 16.0a4 is:

All Platforms
- Updated NoScript to 13.6.14.90101984
- Updated Tor to 0.4.9.6
- Bug tor-browser#43858: Clean out deprecated or unused methods in TorConnect
- Bug tor-browser#44251: Drop pt_config.json meek-azure migration logic
- Bug tor-browser#44546: Rename appearance-chooser-item to setting-chooser-item after we reach nightly 149
- Bug tor-browser#44621: Move about:torconnect back to browser
- Bug tor-browser#44702: Rebase alpha onto 149.0a1
- Bug tor-browser#44720: Migrate New Identity commit to Tor Browser
- Bug tor-browser#44753: Drop TorProvider.isBootstrapDone
- Bug tor-browser#44755: Trusted Types (Firefox 148 and above) + Web Workers broken on Safer Level
- Bug rebase-149#44757: Update tests for removed Services.search [tor-browser]
- Bug tor-browser#44761: Safer Level's worker patching filters out Worker constructor options
- Bug tor-browser#44763: Disable WebGPU until audited
- Bug tor-browser#44764: Review Mozilla 2012344: Hide main AI settings when the feature is blocked
- Bug tor-browser#44765: Review Mozilla 1972073: Convert Sidebar to config-based prefs
- Bug tor-browser#44767: Safer Level's worker patching throws on new about:blank frames with Trusted Types
- Bug tor-browser#44772: Review Mozilla 1980264: Canvas randomization is too slow
- Bug tor-browser#44778: Safer Level: xray causes patched TrustedTypePolicy instances to be unusable by content.
- Bug tor-browser#44801: Redact onion origins from Location.ancestorOrigins.
- Bug tor-browser#44814: Disable trustpanel until our new designs are ready
Windows + macOS + Linux
- Updated Firefox to 149.0a1
- Bug tor-browser#44714: The browser opens a new about:blank tab in 148
- Bug tor-browser#44780: AIFeature.sys.mjs failures in 149 desktop builds
- Bug tor-browser#44781: Use a static page title for about:torconnect
- Bug tor-browser#44793: privacy.spoof_english console error in about:preferences
- Bug tor-browser#44797: Clean up about:torconnect styling
- Bug tor-browser#44799: Onionize toggle in about:tor uses blue text color
Android
- Updated GeckoView to 149.0a1
- Bug tor-browser#43790: Address "Various android workarounds" commit introduced in the 138 rebase
- Bug tor-browser#44332: Fix android tor logs screen issues presented in 144 rebase
- Bug tor-browser#44594: DoH is visible on Android
- Bug tor-browser#44653: Disable "Allow search suggestions in private sessions" prompt presented in RR 148 android
- Bug tor-browser#44694: Remove new "Tab bar" feature on Android
- Bug tor-browser#44698: Clean up comments in AccountSettingsFragment.kt. FIXME: Update A-S
- Bug tor-browser#44700: Untracked change to HomepageHeader.kt
- Bug tor-browser#44751: Noscript (and likely any extension) can be accidently turned off on Android alpha
- Bug tor-browser#44752: Remove new expanded toolbar option on Android due to fingerprintability
- Bug tor-browser#44785: Fix SiteSecurityRobot.kt after the 149 rebase
- Bug tor-browser#44788: Extensions are unreachable via 3 dot menu in alpha (android)
- Bug tor-browser#44789: Icon of "New Circuit" is not centered but lies in top left corner
Build System
- All Platforms
  - Bug tor-browser#43180: Remove translation CI 13.5 legacy extension
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41758: Rename tools/signing/deploy-legacy to tools/signing/redeploy-update_responses-release
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41766: Use gzip for all platforms for Go vendoring
- Windows + macOS
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41741: Create a 13.5-specific update path
- macOS
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41753: Allow running custom commands when vendoring Go dependencies

Arti 2.2.0 released: HTTP CONNECT, RPC, and Relay development.

2026-03-31T00:00:00Z

Arti is our ongoing project to create a next-generation Tor implementation in Rust. We're happy to announce the latest release, Arti 2.2.0.

This release adds support for using HTTP CONNECT rather than SOCKS, when connecting to the Tor network via Arti. This previously-experimental feature is now included a full build, and will then be enabled by default. The HTTP CONNECT protocol is available over the same port as SOCKS.

The RPC client library (arti-rpc-client-core) now supports non-blocking requests, and integration with application event loops. And the RPC system now supports administrative access to the Arti instance, via a new "superuser" facility.

We also fixed a low-severity security issue, TROVE-2026-005, which would somewhat weaken DoS resistance in in certain unusual embedded build configurations.

Behind the scenes we have been working on relay support, including relay channels and circuits, and directory server functionality (mirrors and authorities). As ever there are also lots of bugfixes, cleanups, and test and CI improvements.

For full details on what we've done, including API changes, and for information about many more minor and less-visible changes, please see the CHANGELOG.

For more information on using Arti, see our top-level README, and the documentation for the arti binary.

Thanks to everybody who's contributed to this release, including hjrgrn, HydroxideUnlaced, Nihal, and Tobias Stoeckmann.

Also, our deep thanks to our sponsors for funding the development of Arti!

New Release: Tails 7.6

2026-03-26T00:00:00Z

New features

Automatic Tor bridges

You can now learn about Tor bridges directly from the Tor Connection assistant in Tails.

Tor bridges are secret Tor relays that hide that you are connecting to Tor. If connecting to Tor is blocked from where you are, you can use a bridge as your first Tor relay to circumvent this censorship.

In Tails 7.6, choose Connect to Tor automatically when opening Tor Connection. If access to the Tor network is blocked, the bridge configuration screen offers a new option called Ask for a Tor bridge based on your region.

This feature uses the same technology as the connection assistant in Tor Browser outside of Tails, which was introduced in Tor Browser 11.5 (July 2022).

Tails downloads information about bridges that are most likely to work in your region from the Moat API of the Tor Project. To circumvent censorship, this connection is disguised as a connection to another website using domain fronting.

GNOME Secrets

In Tails 7.6, the Secrets password manager replaces KeePassXC.

Secrets has a simpler interface and is better integrated in the GNOME desktop. For example, accessibility features, such as the screen keyboard and cursor size, are working again with Secrets.

Secrets offers to unlock your previous KeePassXC database automatically, because both Secrets and KeePassXC use the same file format to store passwords.

If you miss more advanced features from KeePassXC , you can install KeePassXC as additional software.

The main keyboard shortcuts of Secrets are similar to the ones of KeePassXC , with Shift in addition to Ctrl :

Shift+Ctrl+C : copy password
Shift+Ctrl+V : copy address
Shift+Ctrl+B : copy username
Shift+Ctrl+T : copy one-time password

To see the full list of keyboard shortcuts of Secrets , press Ctrl+?.

Changes and updates

Update Electrum from 4.5.8 to 4.7.0.
Update Tor Browser to 15.0.8.
Update Thunderbird to 140.8.0.
Update most firmware packages. This improves support for newer hardware: graphics, Wi-Fi, and so on.

Fixed problems

Translate the confirmation dialog that appears before saving the language and keyboard layout on the USB stick. (#21448)

Fix the Learn More button in the Thunderbird migration notification. (#21455)

Fix automated upgrades in Turkish. (#21466)

For more details, read our changelog.

Get Tails 7.6

To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 7.0 or later to 7.6.
If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an automatic upgrade, please try to do a manual upgrade.

To install Tails 7.6 on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of upgrading.

To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails 7.6 directly:

Support and feedback

For support and feedback, visit the Support section on the Tails website.

New Release: Tor Browser 15.0.8

2026-03-24T00:00:00Z

Tor Browser 15.0.8 is now available from the Tor Browser download page and also from our distribution directory.

This version includes important security updates to Firefox.

Send us your feedback

If you find a bug or have a suggestion for how we could improve this release, please let us know.

Full changelog

The full changelog since Tor Browser 15.0.7 is:

All Platforms
- Updated NoScript to 13.6.12.1984
- Bug tor-browser#44663: NoScript behavior on “Safer” security level prevents integrity checks for dynamically loaded javascript
- Bug tor-browser#44680: Properly handle subdocuments created by data: URLs
- Bug tor-browser#44761: Safer Level's worker patching filters out Worker constructor options
- Bug tor-browser#44771: Rebase Tor Browser stable onto 140.9.0esr
- Bug tor-browser#44784: Backport Security Fixes from Firefox 149
- Bug tor-browser-build#41738: Allow to specify an unsupportedURL on update responses
Windows + macOS + Linux
- Updated Firefox to 140.9.0esr
- Bug tor-browser#44327: ERROR: Your Tor Browser profile cannot be loaded. It may be missing or inaccessible
- Bug tor-browser#44386: Firefox profiles no longer work in Tor Browser 15.0
Linux
- Bug tor-browser#44657: Backport tor-browser#44394: Do not read default prefs from /etc/firefox
Android
- Updated GeckoView to 140.9.0esr
Build System
- Windows + Linux + Android
  - Updated Go to 1.25.8
  - Bug tor-browser#44249: Backport tor-browser-build#41580: Update Go major to 1.25.x

Setting Up a Tor Relay at National Taiwan Normal University: A Practical Experience of Communicating with the University and Leaving Open Possibilities

2026-03-23T00:00:00Z

This is a guest post from our friends at anoni.net. This article was made possible with support from Open Culture Foundation.

Preface: Why Talk About Anonymous Networks on Campus?

In many places, the internet is monitored closely and managed centrally. In that environment, anonymous communication is not just a technical choice. It supports safe exploration, research, and expression. In Taiwan, this matters because we sit in a sensitive part of East Asia. Internet freedom and communication resilience are practical skills for handling real pressure.

Universities and academic networks have historically been the earliest places where new technologies and public infrastructure are experimented with. The following interview documents how a computer science student at National Taiwan Normal University, also a member of the anonymous network community, stepped into institutional reality on campus, communicated with the university, and attempted to actually set up a Tor Relay.

Within the anonymous network community, people often talk about technology and ideals. The hard part is not the configuration itself. The question is whether the relay can survive in the real world.

This time, we interviewed a partner from the anonymous network community, NZ, who is currently studying in the Department of Computer Science at National Taiwan Normal University. He set up a Tor Relay on campus by working openly with the university system and completing the full administrative process.

蘇恩立 (Su En-Li, NZ) is currently a third-year undergraduate student in the Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering at National Taiwan Normal University. With a strong interest in information security and network governance, he is currently responsible for operating and maintaining the first Tor node on Taiwan Academic Network (TANet). In addition to hands-on technical practice, he is also dedicated to knowledge sharing, serving as an anonymous network course instructor in the GDGoC NTNU student club. He has long been involved in Taiwan's open source and information security communities, and has volunteered multiple times at major technical conferences such as SITCON, HITCON, and COSCUP, demonstrating both community service experience and strong technical passion.

Why Set Up a Tor Relay at a University?

His motivation was simple. If anonymous networks in Taiwan only show up in niche communities, overseas VPSs, or are treated as gray-area tools, they will not be taken seriously. Universities—especially academic networks like TANet—are meant to support research, experimentation, and public interest. That is why this kind of foundational infrastructure can fit there.

He was also fully aware of the real-world constraints. Taiwan's academic network is highly centralized, with outbound connectivity controlled by the Ministry of Education. In practice, this setup limits what anonymous networks can do.

Because of those limits, he wanted to find out: "Under such constraints, can it at least exist?"

How Did He Talk to the University? The Goal Was to Help Them Explain It Clearly

Administrative Process Timeline

When he moved from ideas to action, he did not frame Tor as something "cool" or radical. He explained it in terms the university could work with:

This is a Tor Relay, not an Exit Node
It does not directly provide content to external users
It is an experiment in network infrastructure and anonymous communication

Process-wise, he exchanged emails with network administrators, professors, and the department chair. He made sure everyone who needed to sign off—or be "CC'd"—understood what this machine would do. The university's requirement was practical: if the Ministry of Education asked about it, they needed to be able to explain it. That became the entry point for communication.

The Administrative Process Is a Hassle, but It Can Still Work

Project Proposal Document

At National Taiwan Normal University, all outbound connections are blocked by default. Any service requires applying for an exception, including specifying IP addresses, intended use, and supporting documentation, and ultimately ensuring it aligns with the university's reporting procedures to the Ministry of Education. He described this process as annoying and predictable.

As long as one is willing to write the paperwork and explain things clearly, this path does exist.

Student Organizations and Outreach: Let Tor Mean More Than a Label

Student Organization Event: Anonymous Network Workshop

Beyond the machine itself, he also organized anonymous network–related activities through student clubs on campus, introducing Tor, anonymous communication, and the design principles behind them. Even if attendance wasn't always high, it helped create a place where people could understand that "anonymous networks ≠ criminal tools," without leaning on stereotypes.

These efforts may not be highly visible. They still matter.

Practical Advice and Pitfalls for Others

The following points are distilled from this experience, intended as a reference for anyone who wants to promote or deploy a Tor Relay on a university campus in the future.

Actionable Advice

Take the public route from the start: don't wait until something goes wrong to explain—let network administrators and supervising professors know what you are doing early on.
Clearly distinguish between a Tor Relay and an Exit Node: this is almost always the deciding factor in whether communication succeeds, so be explicit about the difference in risk.
Explain things in a way the university can "account for": you are not asking faculty to support anonymous networks ideologically. You are making sure they can answer questions when asked.
Expect a lot of paperwork: IP addresses, outbound connectivity, and usage descriptions are all basic requirements.

Common Pitfalls

Assuming technical correctness is enough: within academic networks, institutional processes often determine success or failure before technology does.
Underestimating the Ministry of Education's level of control: most universities block outbound connections by default, and any exceptions must align with formal reporting procedures.
Failing to plan for maintenance and account ownership: account privileges after graduation directly affect whether long-term operation is possible.

Conclusion

This attempt to deploy a Tor Relay at National Taiwan Normal University is not an endpoint, and it is not a definitive answer. Still, it proves one thing clearly:

Within Taiwanese universities, as long as one is willing to communicate and explain,
Anonymous networks are not entirely without a place.

If we hope to see Tor Relays on more campuses in the future, these "uncool but time-consuming" efforts may well be the most important foundation of all.

Further Reflection: Why Are Attempts Like This Worth Preserving?

After reading this interview, it is easy to focus on "what he accomplished." For the anonymous network community, the key detail is "how this was accomplished."

In Taiwan, anonymous networks do not lack technical documentation or ideological support. The real scarcity is experience from actually working through the real institutional system once. Especially in an environment where academic networks are highly centralized and outbound connectivity is tightly controlled, distributed anonymous infrastructure like Tor Relays is inherently difficult to sustain.

This implementation at National Taiwan Normal University was not meant to provide a final answer for anonymous networks. It was a concrete attempt made within real-world institutions. It may not immediately improve the performance or security of anonymous networks, and it was not intended to become a directly reproducible standard process. What it did achieve was leaving behind a clearly visible path of practice—one that can be understood, referenced, and built upon.

This path shows us that:

Anonymous networks do not necessarily have to operate only overseas, underground, or in legal gray areas
Campuses are not places that can only reject such efforts; they need to be properly informed
Administrative procedures may be cumbersome, but they are not entirely impossible
Beyond technology, language, patience, and institutional understanding are equally important

For Taiwan, the advancement of anonymous networks is unlikely to begin with a "killer application." It will more likely grow from slow, tedious, and even somewhat clumsy attempts.

If, in the future, we hope to see Tor Relays or other anonymous communication infrastructure across more universities and academic network nodes, then these early experiences—whether successful or obstructed—are all worth recording, discussing, and passing on.

Anonymous networks exist because communities keep communicating, understanding each other, and cooperating over the long run. Through those processes, internet freedom can move from an abstract concept to public infrastructure that can actually be put into practice.

Tor × EFF University Challenge: Make Your Campus Part of the Anonymous Network

The Tor Project and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) jointly run the Tor University Challenge, inviting university students around the world to set up Tor Relays on their campuses using academic networks. By successfully deploying and maintaining a Tor Relay within a university network, participating institutions can have their university names listed on the project's official website—showing the world that their campus is actively contributing to the infrastructure of anonymous communication and internet freedom.

This is both a technical challenge and a symbolic act: it represents a university's willingness to support the practice of privacy, anonymity, and an open internet within the realms of education and research. In the National Taiwan Normal University case discussed here, we saw the same point in practice: if people are willing to communicate and understand institutional constraints, Tor Relays can exist on Taiwanese campuses.

If you are currently a university student with an interest in networking, cybersecurity, privacy, or public infrastructure, the Tor University Challenge offers a concrete and documentable starting point: make your work visible beyond your own computer—so others can see it.

→ Project website: https://toruniversity.eff.org

The Role of Tor Relays in Academic Networks

Many people have heard of Tor, but do not necessarily understand its significance within academic networks.

What Is a Tor Relay?

Tor is an anonymous communication network that routes traffic through multiple nodes using layered encryption. A Tor Relay (middle relay) helps forward encrypted traffic and, by design, cannot see either the user's source or the final destination.

It does not provide content. It is not an exit node.

Why Are Academic Networks Suitable for Discussing Tor Relays?

Academic networks are inherently meant to support experimentation
Universities carry public responsibility and research legitimacy
Experience can be accumulated in a controlled environment, rather than relying solely on overseas resources

Taiwan's academic network is highly centralized and externally controlled, so Tor's presence here feels more like a "compressed experiment."

Why Is It Still Worth Doing Even If the Impact Is Limited?

The goal is not only performance. We are trying to:

Leave behind an institutionally "viable path"
Accumulate experience in communicating with universities
Bring anonymous networks into public discussion, rather than leaving them as underground technologies

正體中文 (Traditional Chinese)

本文為 anoni.net 的客座文章。本文章由財團法人開放文化基金會支持完成。

在台師大架設 Tor Relay：一段與學校溝通、留下可能性的實作經驗

前言：為什麼在校園談匿名網路？

在網路高度被監控與集中管理的時代，匿名通訊是安全探索、研究與表達的重要基礎。對台灣而言，這個問題尤其現實——我們身處東亞關鍵位置，網路自由與通訊韌性，早已從抽象價值變成社會能否承受壓力的底層能力。

大學與學術網路，本來就是新技術與公共基礎建設最早被嘗試的地方。接下來的訪談，記錄了一位台師大資工系學生、也是匿名網路社群夥伴，如何在校園裡，實際走進制度、與學校溝通，嘗試把 Tor Relay 真正架起來。

在匿名網路社群裡，我們常常談技術、談理想。真正困難的是「這台機器能不能在現實世界活下來」。

這次，我們訪談了一位匿名網路社群的夥伴 NZ，目前就讀臺灣師範大學資工系。他在校內成功架設了一個 Tor Relay，而且選擇正面與學校體制溝通，走完行政流程。

蘇恩立（NZ），現就讀於國立臺灣師範大學資訊工程學系三年級。對資訊安全與網路治理深感興趣，目前負責維運臺灣學術網路（TANet）首個 Tor 節點。除技術實作外，亦致力於知識共享，於 GDGoC NTNU 學校社團擔任匿名網路課程講師，也長期參與臺灣開源與資安社群，曾多次擔任 SITCON、HITCON 及 COSCUP 等大型技術年會志工，具備社群服務經驗與技術熱忱。

為什麼想在學校架 Tor Relay？

他的出發點其實很單純：如果匿名網路在台灣永遠只存在於社群、海外 VPS，甚至被當成灰色地帶的工具，那它很難被認真對待。而大學，特別是學術網路（TANet），本來就承載著研究、實驗與公共性，理論上應該能容納這類基礎設施嘗試。

不過他也很清楚現實限制：台灣學術網路高度集中，對外連線受教育部控管，匿名網路在這樣的結構裡，本來就不容易發揮完整效果。

但正因如此，他更想知道：「在這樣的限制下，至少能不能先存在？」

跟學校怎麼談？重點在於讓對方能交代

行政流程時間表

實際行動時，他沒有把 Tor 包裝成什麼很酷或很激進的東西，而是用學校能理解的語言來說明：

這是一個 Tor Relay，不是 Exit Node
它不會直接對外提供內容
是網路基礎建設與匿名通訊的實驗

在流程上，他與網管、教授、系主任之間有實際的 mail 往返，讓每個需要簽名、需要被「CC」的人，都知道這台主機在做什麼。學校不需要完全懂 Tor。只要今天教育部來問，他們能回答得出來，這就是溝通的切入點。

行政流程真的很麻煩，但走得通

專案計畫說明書

在台師大的情況下，對外連線預設是全部封鎖，任何服務都必須申請例外開放，包含 IP、用途、說明文件，最後還得能對應到學校回報教育部的流程。他形容這段過程「很煩，但可預期」。

只要願意寫文件、願意解釋，這條路是存在的。

社團與推廣：至少讓 Tor 不再只是標籤

社團活動：匿名網路工作坊

除了機器本身，他也曾在校內社團舉辦匿名網路相關活動，介紹 Tor、匿名通訊與其背後的設計理念。即使參與人數不一定多，但至少讓「匿名網路 ≠ 犯罪工具」這件事，有機會在校園被好好講清楚，讓大家不再只靠刻板印象理解。

這些累積，或許不顯眼，但很重要。

給其他大學的行動建議與踩雷提醒

以下整理自這次經驗，給未來想在大學校園中推動 Tor Relay 的夥伴參考。

行動建議

一開始就走公開路線：不要等出事才解釋，先讓網管與指導教授知道你在做什麼。
清楚區分 Tor Relay 與 Exit Node：這幾乎是溝通成敗的關鍵，務必要講清楚風險差異。
用「學校能交代」的語言說明：不要用動員的語氣，而要讓他們在被問時能回答得出來。
預期 paperwork 很多：IP、對外連線、用途說明，這些都是基本門檻。

常見的困難點

以為技術正確就夠了：在學術網路裡，制度往往比技術更先決定生死。
低估教育部控管的影響：多數學校預設全封鎖，例外開放一定要能對應回報流程。
沒有想清楚維護與帳號問題：畢業後帳號權限，會直接影響能不能長期維運。

結語

這次在台師大的 Tor Relay 嘗試，沒有把事情做成終點，也不是唯一的標準答案。但它至少證明了一件事：

在台灣的大學裡，只要願意溝通、願意解釋 ...
匿名網路仍然有位置。

如果未來我們希望在更多校園看到 Tor Relay，那這些「不酷、但很花時間」的努力，可能正是最重要的基礎。

延伸思考：為什麼這樣的嘗試，值得被留下來？

讀完這段訪談，我們很容易把焦點放在「他做成了什麼」。但對匿名網路社群而言，更重要的其實是：這件事是怎麼被做成的。

在台灣，匿名網路並不缺技術文件，也不缺理念支持，真正稀少的，是「在現實制度裡走過一次」的經驗。尤其是在學術網路高度集中、對外連線受控的環境中，Tor Relay 這類分散式匿名基礎設施，本來就不容易存在。

這次在台師大的實作，是一次在現實制度中踏出的實際嘗試。它不是為了替匿名網路給出最終解答。它未必能立刻改變匿名網路的效能或安全性，也不意圖成為一套可直接複製的標準流程，但它成功留下了一條清楚可見、能被理解與參考的實踐路徑。

這條路徑告訴我們：

匿名網路不一定只能在海外、地下或灰色地帶運作
校園不是只有拒絕一種選擇，需要把內容講清楚
行政流程雖然繁瑣，但仍然有機會走通
技術之外，語言、耐心與制度理解同樣重要

對台灣來說，匿名網路的推動，很可能從這些看似緩慢、瑣碎、甚至有點笨拙的嘗試累積開始。

如果未來，我們希望在更多大學、更多學術網路節點中，看見 Tor Relay 或其他匿名通訊基礎設施，那麼這些早期經驗（無論成功或卡關）都值得被記錄、被討論、被傳承。

匿名網路的存在，來自社群在長時間的溝通、理解與協作中逐漸形成的成果。透過這樣的過程，網路自由得以從概念，轉化為可被實踐的公共基礎。

Tor × EFF 大學挑戰計畫：讓你的學校成為匿名網路的一部分

Tor 專案與美國電子前線基金會（EFF）共同推動 Tor University Challenge（大學挑戰計畫），邀請全球的大學生在校園內，透過學術網路實際架設 Tor Relay（中繼節點），協助匿名網路的運作與穩定。只要成功在大學校園中，使用學校網路建立並維運 Tor Relay，就可以將學校名稱登錄到計畫官方網站，讓全世界看見你的大學，實際參與了匿名通訊與網路自由的基礎建設。

這同時是技術挑戰，也是一種象徵：代表你的學校，願意在教育與研究的場域中，支持隱私、匿名與開放網路的實踐。在這次台灣師範大學的案例中，我們也看見：只要願意溝通、願意理解制度，Tor Relay 就有機會出現在台灣的校園。

如果你也正在大學就讀，對網路、資安、隱私或公共基礎建設有興趣，Tor University Challenge 提供了一個具體而可被記錄的起點：讓你的行動不再只停留在自己的電腦上，也能被世界看見。

→ 計畫網站：https://toruniversity.eff.org

Tor Relay 在學術網路中的角色解說

很多人聽過 Tor，但不一定理解它在「學術網路」裡的意義。

Tor Relay 是什麼？

Tor 是一個透過多層加密與多個節點轉送流量的匿名通訊網路。其中 Tor Relay（中繼節點）的功能，是協助傳遞加密流量，本身看不到使用者的來源與最終目的。

它不提供內容，也不扮演出口節點。

為什麼學術網路適合討論 Tor Relay？

學術網路本來就承載實驗性質
大學有公共性與研究正當性
可以在受控環境中累積經驗，不必完全仰賴海外資源

但同時，台灣學術網路高度集中、對外受控，這也讓 Tor 在這裡更像是一種「被壓縮的實驗」。

為什麼即使效果有限，仍然值得做？

這次嘗試要達成的重點是：

留下一條制度上「能走的路」
累積與學校溝通的經驗
讓匿名網路進入公共討論，不僅僅只是地下技術

New Alpha Release: Tor Browser 16.0a4

2026-03-11T00:00:00Z

Tor Browser 16.0a4 is now available from the Tor Browser download page and also from our distribution directory.

This version includes important security updates to Firefox.

Moreover, Tor Browser Alphas are now based on Firefox's betas. Please read more about this important change in the Future of Tor Browser Alpha blog post.

If you are an at-risk user, require strong anonymity, or just want a reliably-working browser, please stick with the stable release channel.

Send us your feedback

If you find a bug or have a suggestion for how we could improve this release, please let us know.

Full changelog

The full changelog since Tor Browser 16.0a3 is:

All Platforms
- Updated NoScript to 13.6.6.90401984
- Updated zlib to 1.3.2
- Bug tor-browser#44663: NoScript behavior on “Safer” security level prevents integrity checks for dynamically loaded javascript
- Bug tor-browser#44675: Restore "BB 43850: Modify the Contrast Control settings for RFP" dropped during the 148.0a1 rebase
- Bug tor-browser#44679: Review Mozilla 2006066: Credit cards autofill settings are not visible
- Bug tor-browser#44680: Properly handle subdocuments created by data: URLs
- Bug tor-browser#44687: Security level requires a restart in a new profile after 148 update
- Bug tor-browser#44689: Forwardport tor-browser#44668 from legacy to alpha: Set detailsURL in update XML to be useful for 13.5 users
- Bug tor-browser#44701: Unexpected change to netwerk/url-classifier/components.conf
- Bug tor-browser#44706: creating a new profiles causes crash ENOTTY
- Bug tor-browser-build#41738: Allow to specify an unsupportedURL on update responses
Windows + macOS + Linux
- Updated Firefox to 148.0a1
- Bug tor-browser#42664: Use mozilla token sizes in CSS
- Bug tor-browser#44634: Review Mozilla 2006250: add ai window about:preferences section within ai features
- Bug tor-browser#44682: Wrong pid in the exit log
- Bug tor-browser#44709: Hide the AI settings panel
- Bug tor-browser#44710: Hide about:preferences#translations
- Bug tor-browser#44713: The about dialog is missing some padding in 148.0a1
- Bug tor-browser#44717: Search suggestion settings are visible in 148
Windows + Linux
- Bug tor-browser-build#40892: Move torrc-defaults, geoip and geoip6 on Windows and Linux
Windows
- Bug tor-browser#44461: Window controls are missing on Windows
- Bug tor-browser#44633: Move D3D11 function from local webrtc changes to tbb webrtc patches
Linux
- Bug tor-browser#44394: Do not read default prefs from /etc/firefox
Android
- Updated GeckoView to 148.0a1
- Bug tor-browser#43349: Add user feedback for when Tor connects (Android)
- Bug tor-browser#43909: Review Mozilla: TBD: new Android tab-strip feature
- Bug tor-browser#44226: Disable all link sharing functionality
- Bug tor-browser#44274: Review Mozilla 1986534: Disable screenshots in PBM
- Bug tor-browser#44469: Fix branding on Android RR
- Bug tor-browser#44506: Remove more sync from 147
- Bug tor-browser#44582: Fix or remove new settings search functionality on Android
- Bug tor-browser#44661: Restore or fix new rebase-148 uses of moz assets instead of TB ones
- Bug tor-browser#44718: Fix splash screen branding and other issues in RR
- Bug tor-browser#44721: Android build failure in nightlyOssLicensesTask: missing dependencies.json file
Build System
- All Platforms
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41690: Merge list_toolchain_updates-firefox-* commands into one
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41725: Update toolchains for Firefox 148
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41726: Check in list_toolchain_updates that the sha512sum we have for the macOS SDK is the same as Mozilla
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41727: Split the list_toolchain_updates_checks script in two
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41728: Update projects/application-services/list_toolchain_updates_checks to check nss sha256sum
- Windows + macOS + Linux
  - Bug tor-browser#44406: Fix CSS linting issues introduced by 146
- Windows + Linux + Android
  - Updated Go to 1.25.8
- Android
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41736: Add generate_gradle_dependencies_list-$project makefile targets
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41737: Remove comment from gen-gradle-deps-file.py saying var/gradle_dependencies_version should be updated
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41743: Make an error if gradle-dependencies-list is missing in the input files
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41744: Reduce duplication between projects/geckoview/build and projects/geckoview/build_apk
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41745: Add .sh file extension to included build_* scripts in projects/geckoview
  - Bug tor-browser-build#41751: Fix the NDK path

Arti 2.1.0 released: Relay and RPC development.

2026-03-03T00:00:00Z

Arti is our ongoing project to create a next-generation Tor implementation in Rust. We're happy to announce the latest release, Arti 2.1.0.

This release contains a lot of behind-the-scenes work on relay support and on RPC development. While Arti still cannot run as a relay, we are making good progress, and we think it will soon be ready for Arti developers to test it as a middle relay.

Additionally, we have overhauled all of Arti's configuration to use a new, derive-deftly-based approach. We believe this will make defining new configuration types easier, saving us development time in the long run.

This release also contains a number of bugfixes, cleanups, as well as improvements to our CI infrastructure.

Finally, Arti 2.1.0 increases our MSRV (Minimum Supported Rust Version) to 1.89.0, in accordance with our MSRV policy.

For full details on what we've done, including API changes, and for information about many more minor and less-visible changes, please see the CHANGELOG.

For more information on using Arti, see our top-level README, and the documentation for the arti binary.

Thanks to everybody who's contributed to this release, including Niel Duysters, Nihal, Nuhiat-Arefin, Robert Bartlensky, carti-it, hjrgrn, moumenalaoui, robertb, and sjcobb!

Also, our deep thanks to our sponsors for funding the development of Arti!

New Release: Tails 7.5

2026-02-26T00:00:00Z

Changes and updates

Update Tor Browser to 15.0.7.
Simplify the home page of Tor Browser.
Update the Tor client to 0.4.9.5.
Update Thunderbird to 140.7.1.
Install Thunderbird as additional software to improve its security, if you have both the Thunderbird Email Client and Additional Software features of the Persistent Storage turned on.

Until Tails 7.5, a new version of Thunderbird was released by Mozilla only a few days after we released a new version of Tails. As a consequence, the version of Thunderbird in Tails was almost always outdated, with known security vulnerabilities.

By installing Thunderbird as additional software, the latest version of Thunderbird is installed automatically from your Persistent Storage each time you start Tails.

If the Thunderbird Migration dialog below appears when you start Thunderbird , it means that Tails successfully installed Thunderbird as additional software.

Include the language pack for Mexican Spanish in Thunderbird in addition to the language pack for Spanish from Spain.

For more details, read our changelog.

Get Tails 7.5

To upgrade your Tails USB stick and keep your Persistent Storage

Automatic upgrades are available from Tails 7.0 or later to 7.5.
If you cannot do an automatic upgrade or if Tails fails to start after an automatic upgrade, please try to do a manual upgrade.

To install Tails 7.5 on a new USB stick

Follow our installation instructions:

The Persistent Storage on the USB stick will be lost if you install instead of upgrading.

To download only

If you don't need installation or upgrade instructions, you can download Tails 7.5 directly:

Support and feedback

For support and feedback, visit the Support section on the Tails website.